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HowMeaning Might Be Normative ∗
ALAN MILLAR
1. The topic
My aim here is (i) to outline an account what it is to grasp the meaning of a
predicative term, and (ii) to draw on that account in an attempt to shed light
on what the normativity of meaning might amount to. Central to the account
is that grasping the meaning of a predicative term is a practical matter—it is
knowing how to use it correctly in a way that implicates having an ability
to use it correctly. This calls for an examination of what it is to use a term
correctly. Two quite different types of correctness are liable to be conﬂated. In
sections 2 and 3 I show why they must be kept apart. In the sections 4 and
5 I consider how correctness of the second type might be conceived within a
practice-theoretic framework and how that framework might make sense of
the idea that meaning is essentially normative. In the concluding section I
respond to an objection.1
∗I am grateful for discussion of an earlier version of this paper at a research seminar at Stirling
at which Philip Ebert, Colin Johnston, Peter Milne, Walter Pedriali, Ben Saunders, and Alexander
Stathopoulos were especially helpful. Thanks also to Jonathan Dancy for written comments on an
earlier version and to Walter Pedriali for written comments that prompted me to introduce much
needed clariﬁcation at a late stage.
1 Throughout I shall be building on, and I hope improving, ideas set out in Millar 2002, 2004
and 2011.
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2. Meaning and correct application conditions
One type of correctness is correctness of application. To apply the term ‘dog’
to something is to predicate it of that thing. Thus I apply ‘dog’ to a thing if
and only if, using that term, I say of it that it is a dog. That application will
be correct if and only if what is thus said is true of the thing to which it is
applied. If it is correct in this sense it is a true application. Correctness of the
second type concerns use more generally: it is use in keeping with the term’s
meaning.2 Simplifying somewhat, a use—perhaps an application—fails to be
in keeping with a term’s meaning if the speaker uses the term in a manner
that fails adequately to respect its conditions of correct (= true) application. I
say more about that in the next section. Here I consider the relation between
meaning and conditions of correct (= true) application.
A meaning of a predicative term is ﬁxed by a concept that the term can
express. Conditions of correct (= true) application of a term display or exhibit
a meaning that it has provided that, by employing the very concept that ﬁxes
that meaning, they spell out necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the term’s
correct application. For instance, in the sense in which it stands for a type of
bird,
(1) ‘goldﬁnch’ correctly applies to a thing if and only if it is a goldﬁnch.3
This speciﬁes the sort of thing to which the term correctly applies when used
in this sense. It does this by means of the very concept that ﬁxes its meaning
if so understood. Even if true, other bi-conditionals spelling out conditions
of correct application will not serve this purpose unless they do likewise. For
instance,
(2) ‘goldﬁnch’ correctly applies to a thing if and only of it is a bird of the
species described on p. 280 of the 1981 edition of Field Guide to the Birds
of Britain
will not serve the purpose.
2 See McDowell 1984 and McGinn 1984: 60 for similar expressions.
3 Expressing a closely related idea, Michael Dummett says, ‘In a case in which we are con-
cerned to convey, or stipulate, the sense of an expression, we shall choose that means of stating
what the referent is which displays the sense: we might borrow a famous pair of terms from the
Tractatus, and say that, for Frege, we say what the referent of the word is, and thereby show what
its sense is’ (Dummett 1973: 227). John McDowell’s (1977) treatment of proper names is, I take it,
one way of developing that idea for the case of those names.
800 ALAN MILLAR
To those who share the language in which it formulated, and who know
what goldﬁnches are, (1) is liable to seem trivial. To those who have no idea
what goldﬁnches are it would be uninformative. This might tempt one to sup-
pose that a better formulation of correct application conditions would provide
more information as to what goldﬁnches are. But (1) is not meant to assist
someone who did not know what goldﬁnches are to understand the sort of
thing to which the term correctly applies. It simply exhibits the meaning of
the term in that it spells out necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the term’s
correct application by means of the very concept that ﬁxes its meaning.
People who have some grasp of the meaning of the term ‘goldﬁnch’ in
the sense in which it stands for a kind of bird, thus some grasp of the con-
cept the term expresses when so understood, might differ in their concep-
tions of what it is to be a goldﬁnch. Some might have little more than a
perceptual-recognitional grasp in that they can visually recognize goldﬁnches
as goldﬁnches. Others might have a rich conception of what it is to be a
goldﬁnch. Yet others might know that goldﬁnches are birds but not know
much else or even how to recognize goldﬁnches by sight. Possessing the con-
cept the term expresses, is compatible with having any of a range of different
conceptions of what goldﬁnches are.4
What about the conditions of correct application of synonyms like ‘chews’
and ‘masticates’? Their conditions would be, respectively,
(3) ‘*** masticates —’ correctly applies to an ordered pair if and only if the
ﬁrst element of the pair masticates the second element of the pair.
(4) ‘*** chews —’ correctly applies to an ordered pair if and only if the ﬁrst
element of the pair chews the second element of the pair.
That ‘chews’ and ‘masticates’ are synonyms is reﬂected in the fact that (3)
would be true if ‘masticates’ in its right-hand side were substituted by ‘chews’
and (4) would be true if ‘chews’ in its right-hand side were substituted by
‘masticates’. For all that, one could grasp the sense of ‘chew’ while having
no grasp of the meaning of ‘masticate’, and vice versa, which is why it can
be informative to learn that to masticate is to chew. It is no surprise that a
sentence like, ‘No one doubts that to chew is to masticate’ is false even though
‘chew’ is synonymous with ‘masticate’. One might doubt that to chew is to
masticate simply because one grasps the meaning of ‘chew’ while having no
idea of what ‘masticate’ means.
4 We could add ‘(the bird)’ to the end of (1) without committing ourselves to supposing that
allwho grasp the sense of ‘goldﬁnch’ must know that goldﬁnches are birds.
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3. Use in keeping with meaning
The second type of correctness is that of use in keeping with meaning. Cor-
rect use in this sense is a use of the term that respects the relevant conditions
of correct (= true) application. In the simplest cases a term has a single re-
ceived meaning and the relevant conditions of correct application are those
that exhibit that meaning.
The key idea here is that a use of a term respects the relevant conditions
of correct application only if its use on the occasion in question manifests an
adequate grasp of those conditions. What I mean by ‘grasp of the conditions’
might more ordinarily be expressed by speaking of what a word is for. For
instance, a somewhat partial grasp of the conditions of application of the term
‘ﬂu’ might be expressed by saying that ‘ﬂu’ is a word for a viral infection
marked by fever and muscular aches.
Consider two contrasting cases of incorrect (= false) application. The ﬁrst
is a false application on the part of someone who knows perfectly well what
the term ‘dog’ means, in the sense in which it picks out a species of domes-
ticated animal, but in dim light applies it to a fox that he mistakes for a dog.
Although this application is false it’s in keeping with the relevant meaning of
‘dog’. This person knows what the term ‘dog’ means, and accordingly his use
manifests a grasp of the relevant conditions of correct application. The error
lies simply in having mistaken a fox for a dog. The second case is an applica-
tion on the part of someone who has not yet fully grasped what ‘fox’ means.
A child might be disposed to apply the term to foxes and to dogs that look a
little like foxes. Applying the term to a young Alsatian dog on some occasion
the child speaks falsely but the error lies not just in the false application but
in the fact that the false application derives from an inadequate grasp of the
relevant conditions of correct (= true) application. The child uses the term as
if it correctly applied not just to foxes but to foxes and some dogs and so fails
to adequately to respect the relevant conditions of correct application. The
mistake is accordingly semantic. The ﬁrst subject’s application of ‘dog’ to a
fox is not.5
5Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (2010a: 2.1.2) ask what motivates the introduction of the
second notion of correctness. The answer to this is simply that to deny that there is this second
type of correctness is to deny that examples of the sort considered point to a different dimension
of evaluation from that marked by the ﬁrst type of correctness. The worry might be whether
the second type of correctness has anything to do with semantics. I ﬁnd this hard to see since
conditions of correct (= true) application surely belong to semantics and correct use in the second
sense has to do with how speakers stand in relation to those conditions.
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Isn’t the ﬁrst case one in which the term is used in a way in which it’s
not supposed to be used? Well, it is a misapplication—an application that is
incorrect in the sense of false—but that is no reason to treat the application
as incorrect in the second sense. A doctor does not fail to use the term ‘ﬂu’
in keeping with its meaning if, misdiagnosing a patient, he says, ‘This patent
has ﬂu’ intending to say that the patient has ﬂu. The doctor might or might
not have been epistemically irresponsible in making his diagnosis but in any
case his use manifests an adequate grasp of the relevant conditions of correct
application and the term used is apt for saying what he intends to say. Simi-
larly, if, lying, I say to someone, ‘I have cleaned out the garage’ I deliberately
make a false application of the expression ‘cleaned out the garage’ but my
use manifests an adequate understanding of the relevant conditions of correct
application.
An application that is incorrect in the second sense might be correct in the
ﬁrst sense. If I were to apply the term ‘arcane’ to a ritual I might intend to
convey, and mean to say, that it is ancient, not realizing that ‘arcane’ means
hidden or secret. Yet the ritual might be arcane in which case my application,
and what I say, would be true despite the fact that it does not manifest a grasp
of the conditions of correct application for the term I use. In the envisaged
circumstance I would say that the ritual is arcane and thus say something that
is true, yet that the ritual is arcane in its received sense is not what I meant to
convey though I uttered the words I did intentionally.
The child’s use of ‘fox’ and my imagined use of ‘arcane’ fail to respect the
relevant conditions of correct application because these uses do not manifest
an adequate grasp of what those conditions are. These uses derive from igno-
rance or inadequate understandings of those conditions. It would be wrong,
however, to suppose that all failures to respect the relevant conditions derive
from ignorance or inadequate understanding. Slips of the tongue need not re-
ﬂect ignorance or misunderstanding of the meaning of the term slipped in, yet
the speaker’s use fails to respect the conditions of correct application pertain-
ing to the term used because it is not a manifestation of the speaker’s grasp of
those conditions. The speaker has a grasp of those conditions but his use does
not stand in the right relation to that grasp.
One might be tempted to suppose that an application of a term is out of
kilter with its meaning only if the subject says of the thing to which it is ap-
plied that it is one thing but intended to say that it is another.6 Many cases of
6R. M. Hare (1963: 8) says that one misuses what he calls a descriptive term if one says that
an object is of one kind, meaning or intending to convey that it is of another kind. He appears to
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misuse, including slips of the tongue, are of this sort, yet it would be wrong
to suppose that all are. When Tyler Burge’s imagined patient (Burge 1979) ut-
ters the words, ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ his use of ‘arthritis’ is incorrect in
both senses. It is false because the pain has nothing to do with the patient’s
joints and arthritis is a condition of joints. He fails to respect the relevant
conditions of correct application since his use does not manifest an adequate
grasp of those conditions. Nonetheless, as the patient uses the term it stands
for arthritis—the condition that doctors diagnose, that scientists research into,
that in its various forms afﬂicts countless people. It seems right that he not
only said that he had arthritis in his thigh but meant to say that he had arthri-
tis in his thigh. Though his use of ‘arthritis’ was informed by a partial, albeit
partially erroneous, conception of what it is for a person to have arthritis the
term is apt for saying what he intended to say. By contrast, my use of ‘ar-
cane’ was not informed by a conception of what it is to be arcane—I had no
idea what it is to be arcane—which is why there was a complete mismatch
between what I said and what I intended to say. A similar case would be a
use of ‘enervate’ on the part of a subject who thought that ‘enervate’ means
energise or enliven.
What about irony? Suppose that just after I have cleaned the kitchen ﬂoor
a member of my family walks over it with muddy boots. I say, ‘That was a
great help’ when what I mean to convey is that it was no help at all. Do I in
this case respect the conditions of correct application of ‘great help’? Again we
need to focus on what it is to respect the conditions of correct application as
that is to be understood here. In the case envisaged my ironical application of
‘great help’ is deliberately false, yet it manifests, and indeed is made possible
by, an adequate grasp of the relevant conditions of correct application. So it
satisﬁes our condition on respecting the relevant conditions.
The next task is to consider how the distinction between types of correct-
ness feeds into an account of the way in which grasp of meaning is practical.
After that I shall address the question of how meaning might be essentially
normative.
4. The practical dimension of knowledge of meaning and the
normativity of meaning
The practical dimension of grasping the meaning of a predicative term is
knowing how to use it correctly, where the know-how is understood to im-
intend this to be a deﬁnition of ‘misuse of a descriptive term’.
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plicate an ability to use the term correctly in the second of the two senses.
We are working with the idea that the measure of correct use of a predicative
term in a given sense is respect for the conditions of correct (= true) application that
exhibit the term’s meaning when used in that sense. This measure is not just a stan-
dard imposed on us from the outside. If we grasp themeaning of a predicative
term then in our uses of it we are sensitive to what the meaning requires of
us. Moreover, in early learning we gain a sense of there being right and wrong
ways of using terms through, among other things, having correct uses encour-
aged and misuses corrected. The conceptions we have of what terms ascribe
can be reﬁned or corrected. All this makes it natural to think that our uses of
words are subject to rules in the sense of prescriptions or requirements that
govern use. These are not merely norms or standards to which it is open to
us to be indifferent. If we use words we incur a commitment to using them
in keeping with the rules that govern their uses—commitments to which it is
not open to us to be indifferent. If we are in breach of the rules then there is a
sense in which we go wrong—we fail to discharge a commitment that we have
incurred just by using those words. This is not to deny that we may play with
words, exploiting them in ways that are not in keeping with their meanings.
But such play depends for its effectiveness on there being rules that can be
ﬂouted.
Assuming there are such rules, what form do they have? Evidently there is
more to using a term than applying it or denying it application. We use a term
when we exploit its meaning in understanding another’s use of it or when we
make inferences from propositions that are articulated by the use of the term.
A developed account of what is involved in correct use should accommodate
the variety of ways in which predicative terms can be used. This diversity
might induce despair about achieving a secure grip on what rules governing
their use could look like. I think that our working idea about the measure of
correct use suggests a way through the complexities.
‘Goldﬁnch’ in its most common sense correctly applies to a thing if and
only if it is a goldﬁnch. That is not a rule, or at least not a prescriptive rule
of the sort for which we are looking, but this is: when using ‘goldﬁnch’ in
its most common sense respect those conditions of correct application. The
activity of using ‘goldﬁnch’ in the sense exhibited by those conditions is, as
I shall say, a practice, that is, an essentially rule-governed activity or cluster
of such activities. It is essentially rule-governed in that no activity could be
that activity unless it were governed by the rule prescribing respect for the
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relevant conditions of correct application.7
The operative conception of a practice applies tomany activities. An exam-
ple is playing tennis. This activity is essentially rule-governed in that nothing
would count as playing tennis unless it were governed by some set of rules
for playing tennis. (Any differences in rules would induce differences in the
activity governed even though variants would have much in common.) Ob-
viously, those who engage in such activity are subject to the rules of the game.
To be subject to rules is simply to be such that one’s behaviour is liable to be
evaluated in terms of accordance or lack of accordance with the rules. But
people can be subject to rules because others in power subject them to those
rules. Merely being subject to rules carries no obligation or commitment to
obeying them. The relation between a player of tennis and the rules govern-
ing the game is more intimate than mere subjection. Should we say, then, that
players are governed by the rules of the game in that they intend to conform
to those rules?8 Even if tennis players have such an intention when they play
it would be absurdly naïve to suppose that necessarily players of rugby intend
to conform to all of the rules of the game. While continuing to be players they
might ﬂout rules to gain advantage if they think they can do so with impunity.
There are, it seems, two dimensions to governance by a rule. One is nor-
mative; the other is psychological. I am working here with the idea that the
normative dimension is best captured by the notion of a commitment that I
brieﬂy employed at the beginning of this section. Plausibly, players, in a game
of rugby, just in virtue of being players, incur a commitment to following all of
the rules. There is a very natural way to conceive of what this commitment
amounts to. It amounts to it being the case that a player, just in virtue of being
a player, ought to avoid continuing to play while not conforming to the rules
of the game.9 Why not say that the commitment amounts to it being the case
7 I am applying here a conception of a practice that is most fully set out in Millar 2004.
8 Glüer and Wikforss (2010b) point out that under an inﬂuential conception of what it is to
follow a rule the answer is afﬁrmative.
9 In previous discussions (Millar 2004, 2011) I qualiﬁed statements to this effect so that the
commitment amounts to it being the case that one ought to avoid continuing to participate while
not following the rules in the absence of some countervailing reason. I envisaged that there might
be reasons to remain within a practice, for instance, in a corrupt institution and subvert it from
within. I am no longer sure that the qualiﬁcation is necessary. (A suggestion to this effect was
made to me at a LOGOS seminar in Barcelona in 2009, though I resisted it at the time.) A whistle-
blower who remains within an organization but ﬂouts its rules to expose wrongdoing, might
continue to be a member of the organization while having, in effect, abandoned some part of its
practices. Playful uses of words might depart from the practices of their use while depending for
their intelligibility on being departures from those very practices.
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that the player, simply in virtue of being a player, ought to follow the rules
of the game? The central point, I think, is that commitments are about the
normative-practical implications of occupying a certain standing, not about
what course to take. Believing certain things commits one to believing other
things. Merely incurring such a commitment does not tell us whether to be-
lieve something we are currently committed to believing. The best response
might be to give up some belief among those that incur the commitment. In-
tending to do something commits one to taking the means necessary to doing
that thing. Merely incurring such a commitment does not tell us whether to
take the means. The best response might be to abandon the intention. The
general point is that incurring a commitment leaves open whether we should
do that to which we are committed rather than alter the condition that incurs
the commitment. This applies to the commitments incurred by participating
in a practice. While participating in a practice incurs a commitment to follow-
ing the rules governing the practice, the mere fact that this commitment has
been incurred does not dictate that the rules should be followed. It might be
that we ought to stop participating in the practice as in the case of practices
of using terms of racial abuse. It makes sense that this should be so. Practices
do not exist in isolation. If we are participating in a practice and the ques-
tion arises whether to continue participating and, by implication continue to
follow the rules, the mere fact that we are participants will yield no answer.
There can be pressing reasons having to do with the impact of the practice
to withdraw from it. Yet these reasons do not impugn the idea that being a
participant commits one to following its rules.
Using the term ‘goldﬁnch’ in its usual sense counts as a practice because
it is an activity that is essentially rule-governed in that it would not be the
activity that it is but for its being governed by the rule prescribing respect for
the condition of correct application that display the relevant meaning. It is in
keeping with the proposed account of how participants relate to the rules of
a practice that those who use ‘goldﬁnch’ in this way incur a commitment to
following this rule. This commitment amounts to it being the case that one
ought to avoid continuing to participate in the practice while not following
this rule. It can be discharged in one of two ways—by withdrawing from the
practice or by following the rule. One could withdraw by giving up the use
the term or more radically by ceasing to use English.
The psychological dimension of governance by rules depends on whether
the rules are formulated and explicitly treated as rules. The rules of soccer can
be written down and cited to guide behaviour. It is correspondingly easy to
say what would count as being governed by such rules. This would be a mat-
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ter of knowingwhat the rules are and submitting oneself to them. (This would
include preparedness to take the consequences if one ﬂouts them.) Rules for
word-use of the sort that I have posited are not generally written down. They
are not rules that guide in theway that the rules of rugby guide because speak-
ers do not routinely have them in mind. This might lead one to be sceptical
that speakers are governed by rules like these. Yet there does seem be a sense
in which we can follow rules, and accordingly be governed by them, even if
we never have them in mind in full generality. It might be that we routinely
follow the rules in question in this sense.
For the sake of argument suppose that there is a rule in the style of Grice’s
Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975) prescribing that we make our contribu-
tions to a conversation relevant given the accepted purpose or direction of the
conversation. This rule could be implicitly followed even by those who never
articulate it. An important part of what that would amount to is that their con-
tributions are in general relevant to the purpose and direction of conversations
in which one takes part, but that by itself would amount to their according to
the rule but not to their following it. It would be crucial that they also have
an ability to recognize concerning uncooperative contributions that they are
to be avoided because they lack relevance. They need not have a general con-
ception of what conversational cooperation amounts to. What matters is that
their own contributions are modulated by their ability to recognize of irrele-
vant contributions that they are or would be inappropriate because irrelevant.
They would have to be sensitive to irrelevance not only in that they actually
avoid it (by-and-large), but also in that they have some understanding of ir-
relevance as to be avoided. In virtue of such understanding they would not
merely accord with the rule; they would implicitly follow it. The question
arises whether a similar story is plausible for the sorts of rules governing the
use of predicative terms that I have envisaged.
We fail to respect the conditions of correct application of a term when our
use of it does not manifest a grasp of those conditions. If the general idea in
play in the discussion of the Cooperative Principle were to apply straightfor-
wardly to the kind of rules governing the use of terms that we are considering,
we would need to make sense of how those implicitly following a rule for a
term can tell of uses that fail to respect the relevant conditions of correct appli-
cation that they fail to respect those conditions and are of a sort to be avoided
on that account. This might seem to ask for quite a lot if only because those
with a grasp of the meaning of the term need not grasp in so many words
what it is to respect the relevant conditions of correct application. But if they
are competent users of the term they will be in command of something that is
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tantamount to this. For instance, if the term is ‘goldﬁnch’ the use they make of
it in their own utterances, and their reactions to uses made by others in their
utterances, will be guided by a conception of the sort of thing to which it cor-
rectly applies. Should the issue arise they will think of the term as correctly
applying to things of that sort. They will be able to recognize uses that clearly
manifest a misconception as inappropriate because indicative of misunder-
standing, and will regard such uses as inappropriate. That they implicitly
follow the rule will be manifested in such ways. Of course, initiates into a
practice for using words count as participants even at a stage in early learning
at which they have no thoughts about words and their use, and even if they
never get beyond that stage. The show keeps on the road in part because a
sufﬁcient number of participants are reﬂective to some degree about their use
of language.
The proposal, then, is that the practical dimension of grasp of the meaning
of a term amounts to knowing how to use it correctly in a sense that implicates
an ability implicitly to follow the relevant rule.10 This account accommodates
the plausible thought that knowing how to use a word is not simply a matter
of having various dispositions, conceived in the standard philosophical way,
but implicates a sense of there being right and wrong ways to use it and an
ability to tell which is which.
5. Resistance to normativity
Meaning is essentially normative if there is something about using an expres-
sion meaningfully that in and of itself makes it the case that those so using it
ought to do something. On the account sketched in the previous section the
normative dimension of the meaning of predicative terms is captured by the
claim that just in virtue of using a term in a particular sense one incurs a com-
10Jennifer Hornsby, defending the view that semantic knowledge is practical, suggests that
‘someone whose knowledge how to φ is practical is able to simply φ (at least so long as it is
actually possible for her to φ’ (Hornsby 2005: 115). To be able simply to φ is to be able to φ
but not through doing something else. In response Jason Stanley remarks that ‘[i]n the case of
individual words (and modes of syntactic combination), there is no . . . ability to do something,
no ability simply to F’ (Stanley 2005: 138). The account I am proposing suggests that Stanley
is unduly pessimistic with respect individual predicative terms. When we are able to use such
terms correctly, in the sense of using them in keeping with the relevant conditions of correct
application, and we exercise that ability in uses that are correct in that sense, we do not do so by
doing something else. And once we bear in mind that use covers so much more than application
we can make sense of how the ability to use a word correctly can implicate an ability to use that
word in combination with others in ways that make sense both syntactically and semantically.
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mitment to following a rule for its use prescribing respect for the conditions of
correct application that display the relevant meaning. The commitment arises
from being a participant in a practice of using of the term in the relevant sense.
To have such a commitment is a matter of it being the case that one ought to
avoid continuing in the practice while ﬂouting this rule.
Some might suggest that the commitments incurred by using terms can
be explained without assuming that meaning is essentially normative. The
thought might be that we have a reason to use a term in a manner that re-
spects its conditions of correct application because otherwise we run the risk
of failing to communicate. Such normativity as there is in this area is taken to
relate to instrumental rationality rather than anything essential to meaning.
On this view there is no need to posit the kind of practice that I am linking
to the correct use of terms and to the normativity of meaning. It is true that
native speakers with command of the term ‘goldﬁnch’, and likely to want to
talk about goldﬁnches or understand the talk of other English speakers about
goldﬁnches, have a very good reason to continue being participants in the
practice, since being a participant is the means to achieve those ends. The
question though is whether uses that are incorrect in the second sense can be
explained as failures of instrumental rationality. I think not since a misuse
would be no less a misuse if the speaker were to have decisive practical rea-
sons to use a term in a manner that fails to respect its conditions of correct
application. It is crucial that we do not conﬂate considerations pertaining to
why one should participate in a practice with what is incumbent upon one if
one is a participant. From the present perspective there is something one has
reason to do just in virtue of being a participant in a practice of using a term,
irrespective of any reasons there might be to participate in the practice: one
has reason either to respect the conditions of correct application of the term or
withdraw from the practice.
Discussion of the normativity of meaning has been seriously distorted by
the problematic assumption that if meaning were essentially normative then its
normativity would be captured by such claims as that ‘red’ ought to be ap-
plied to a thing only if it is red.11 There really is no good reason to accept
this assumption. Those who, by way of telling a lie, say of something that is
not red that it is red might have acted wrongly but there is no reason to think
that they have made some linguistic error. I take it to be a strength of the pre-
11 This goes back to Kripke 1982. See also Gibbard 1994 and, recently, Ginsborg 2012. Some
who object to the essential normativity of meaning are also guided by this assumption. See, for
instance, Horwich 1998 and Hattiangadi 2007.
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ceding discussion that it avoids this assumption and thus avoids objections
to the view that meaning is essentially normative that rest on a conception of
normativity that incorporates it. The key to felicity in this area is having due
regard to the two types of correctness that I have distinguished. Where the
focus is on correctness of the second type, we can happily accommodate the
fact that there need be nothing linguistically incorrect about a false applica-
tion of a predicative term. From such a perspective there is no incentive to
link normativity to the kind of ought-statement that ﬁgures in the problematic
assumption.
6. A problem posed by occasion-sensitivity
The position I have described is theoretically satisfying in that it connects two
notions that are sometimes thought to have their natural homes in quite dif-
ferent theoretical frameworks. These are conditions of correct application and
rules for use. But it faces what threatens to be a signiﬁcant challenge. I shall
describe the challenge and suggest a way to meet it that merits attention.
Jonathan Dancy objects to theories of meaning that invoke rules for use
drawing upon the following conception of meaning.12
. . . the meaning of [a] term is what one knows when one is a com-
petent user of that term. If the term is capable of making a range
of contributions to differing contexts, this is part of what the com-
petent user must know. To be a competent user, then, is to be in
command of the sorts of difference that the presence of the term
can make to the semantic value of the contexts in which it can ap-
propriately be found. . . . The meaning of [a] term, understood in
general, is the range of differences it can make; its meaning in a
given context is to be found somewhere in that range (though of
course some contexts force an extension or other adaptation of that
range). (Dancy 2004: 194)
In the light of this conception Dancy asserts,
There is nothing here that could be captured in a rule. Rules, in
the sense in which we are here concerned, must be articulable in
principle, even if our competent speaker is incapable of articulat-
ing them in practice. But if the meaning of the term consists in
12 I have found Whiting 2010 helpful in relation to what follows.
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an open-ended range of available sorts of semantic contribution in
this way, it is essentially inarticulable. Competence with it will
therefore have to consist in a kind of skill rather than a grasp of a
speciﬁable rule . . . . (Dancy 2004: 196)
I am happy with the idea that linguistic competence is a kind of skill. The
question is whether the view Dancy outlines poses a problem for the account
of grasp of meaning that I have given here.
First we need to consider why one might think that terms have the poten-
tial to make ‘an open-ended range of available sorts of semantic contribution’.
Examples of a sort used by Charles Travis (for instance, in Travis 1989, 1994,
1997, 2000) are suggestive in this respect. Here is one.
Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is
the colour of leaves she paints them. Returning she reports, ‘That’s
better. The leaves are green now.’ She speaks the truth. A botanist
friend then phones, seeking green leaves for a study of green-leaf
chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are green,’ Pia says. ‘You can
have those.’ But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis 1997: 89)
What is being suggested is not that ‘green’ is ambiguous in the way that ‘bank’
is or polysemous in the way that ‘stand’ is. It is that even when understood as
having a particular meaning it does not make the same contribution to what
is said on each occasion on which it is used.
. . . the words ‘is green’, while speaking of being green, may make
any of many semantic contributions to wholes of which they are
a part, different contributions yielding different results as to what
would count as being as they are said to be. (Travis 1997: 92)
One might suppose that the phenomenon is akin to the occasion-sensitivity
of an indexical like ‘now’ which is associated with a function from times of
speaking to times referred to by its use. Pursuing this line the idea, as Travis
puts it, would be that
what ‘is green’ means determines a set of parameters (variables
in speakings), and a function from values of them onto a range of
contributions ‘is green’ might make, such that for any argument
of the function (ﬁxed relevant values of the speaking), the value of
the function is the contribution which ‘is green’ would make on a
speaking so characterized. (1994: 174)
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Travis rejects any such view and there is indeed reason to doubt that the phe-
nomenon yields to a functional treatment because it is implausible that anyone
who fully grasps the meaning of ‘green’ must be aware of, or even sensitive
to, some ﬁxed set of parameters of speakings that select what it contributes to
what is said by its use on any occasion. A pressing question for the present dis-
cussion is whether the examples pose a problem for the claim that predicative
terms are governed by rules prescribing respect for conditions of correct ap-
plication. On the face of it they do if understood in Travis’s way for they raise
a question as to whether it can be right to suppose that there are meaning-
exhibiting conditions of correct application as I have portrayed them. Travis
himself rejects the view that ‘green’ correctly applies to a thing if and only if
it is green. (Travis 2000: 213, using the case of ‘blue’).
Let’s grant this much.
Underdetermination (in relation to the example given of uses of ‘green’)
(a) What is said by ‘The leaves are green’ on the two occasions of
use in the example given is different, and is, therefore, not wholly
ﬁxed by the words used, yet
(b) this is not because the words used are ambiguous or otherwise
polysemous, and
(c) the difference cannot to be explained on the model of standard
treatments of indexicals.
What then can account for this underdetermination? We are liable to be pulled
in two different directions here.
We might think there is a sense in which that of which Pia speaks in her
ﬁrst utterance is different from that of which she speaks in her second ut-
terance. Though in both cases she speaks of the leaves her ﬁrst utterance
speaks of them truly with respect to the colour they have after painting and
her second utterance speaks of them falsely with respect to their current nat-
ural (unadulterated) colour. So one direction in which we might be pulled
is to accepting (a) that what is said of them with respect to their colour after
painting is exactly what is said of them with respect to their current natural
colour and so (b) it is wrong to assume that what ‘green’ contributes to what is
said by either utterance is different. (One is tempted to say here, ‘If the same
colour is ascribed then surely what is said on both occasions is the same—that
something has that colour.) But there is a pull from a different direction. Re-
spects in which things can be green are just ways of being green. So Pia’s ﬁrst
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application attributes one way of being green to her leaves and her second
falsely attributes another way of being green to her leaves. From this perspec-
tive, what is attributed is different. Correspondingly, what ‘green’ contributes
to what is said by Pia’s ﬁrst utterance is such that the utterance ascribes one
way of being green while what it contributes to what is said by her second
utterance is such that this utterance ascribes a different way of being green.
The contributions are different as Travis supposes. Other examples serve to
suggest that this is the right way to go. A surface might be green because
made of green plastic. It would look green if seen in daylight. A different
surface might be green because bathed in green light. If one said of the latter
that it was green in a context in which the colour of the material of which it
was made was at issue one would speak falsely. So the contribution ‘green’
makes to an application of it to a surface can be such that what it ascribes to
the surface is being green in the ﬁrst respect, and it can be such that what
the application ascribes to the surface is being green in the second respect.
On this way of thinking what becomes of the tempting thought that since the
same colour is ascribed what ‘green’ contributes to what is said is the same
in the two cases? That thought seems compelling because the same concept
is in play and accordingly there is a sense in which the meaning of the word
is constant across the applications. But as Travis remarks, ‘a concept by itself
does not determine which ways for things to be, so which things, satisfy the
concept’ (1994: 181)
If this view is right how does the context of utterance contribute to ﬁxing
what is said? We are to reject the idea that for the case of ‘green’ there is some
ﬁxed set of parameters associated with the relevant utterances and a function
from those parameters to which colour-respect is at issue. Even so, observing
Pia ﬁnish her leaf painting, what she says in speaking as she does would be
clear. Davidsonian considerations about interpretation kick in at this point.13
To the extent that a person’s utterance about present circumstances is intelli-
gible it must make sense as saying something that the speaker could (perhaps
ineptly) treat as being pertinent to, and reasonable in, those circumstances.
What Pia says ﬁrst reﬂects what it would make sense for her to say with the
words she uses given her strange preoccupations. That it is the colour she has
painted on the leaves of which she speaks would be clear to us because, as
the situation has been described, only that understanding would make sense
of her speaking as she does. Likewise in speaking to her friend the context
makes it clear that she can be speaking only of the natural colour the leaves
13 For an outline of what I take the central considerations to be see Millar 2004: ch. 1.
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have. (Presumably she is being mischievous.)
Another example used by Travis (1989: 18-19) yields to a similar treat-
ment. In one context, saying ‘There is milk in the fridge’ might pertain to the
availability of milk for some mode of consumption—drinking, adding to tea,
making a cake mixture, and the like. In another it might pertain to a pud-
dle of spilt milk that is still there despite an attempt to clean the fridge. On
Travis’s view the contribution of ‘milk’ to what is said is different in the two
cases. One might ﬁnd this hard to credit because both utterances attribute the
presence of milk to the contents of the fridge, but there are different ways in
which milk can be present—as a stain on a garment or on a ﬂoor, in a carton
for storing milk for consumption, or as a drip on a mother’s breast. An utter-
ance applying ‘milk’ might attribute its presence in any of various ways and
so what ‘milk’ contributes to what is said will vary accordingly.
Travis (1997: 91) is, I think, right to dismiss the suggestion that the phe-
nomenon in question should be considered to be a case of ellipsis if that is
taken to mean that the words used are shorthand for a longer sentence that
does not admit of diverse possible understandings and can therefore serve to
ﬁxwhat is said. The problemwith this is that if underdetermination of the sort
under consideration is pervasive then those further words could bear different
understandings in different contexts. It’s true, and instructive, that if anyone
were wondering what Pia said by her words on either occasion, further words
could make this clear. Pia’s ﬁrst utterance could be clariﬁed by saying, ‘With
respect of the colour they have been painted the leaves are green’. Her second
utterance could be clariﬁed by saying, ‘With respect to their natural colour the
leaves are green’. This is so even if the clarifying words themselves admit of
different understandings in that there are possible contexts, other than those
in which the clarifying words are actually used, in which what they would
say would be different.
The upshot is that a premise concerning the meaning of terms in Dancy’s
case against the invocation of rules for the use of terms looks to be correct.
Supposing that it is, does Dancy have a good case against the account of rules
that I gave—the account on which rules for use of predicative terms prescribe
respect for the relevant conditions of correct (=true) application? I suggest
that the account may stand if we reﬁne our conception of meaning-exhibiting
conditions of correct application to accommodate occasion-sensitivity. For a
term like ‘green’ the form of such conditions must be something like this: in
the sense in which it stands for a colour, ‘green’ correctly applies to a thing on
an occasion of use if and only if there is a certain way for things to be coloured,
the occasion is such that what is at issue is that way for things to be coloured,
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and the thing is green in that way. The term ‘milk’ may be used to ascribe the
presence of milk in a variety of forms and the words used on an occasion of
use need not by themselves determine which form is at issue. Accordingly,
‘milk’ applies to a substance on an occasion if and only if there is a certain
form in which milk can be present, the occasion is such that what is at issue
is whether milk is present in that form, and the substance is milk present in
that form. The form at issue might be evident because interlocutors are both
attending to a stain on the ﬂoor or a puddle in a fridge or it might be evident
because of conversation raising a question as to the availability of milk for
consumption.
I emphasised in section 1 that those who have some grasp of the meaning
of a predicative termmight have diverse conceptions of what it is to fall under
it. Clearly it can be part of one’s conception of what it is to be green that
there can be different respects in which something can be green and it can
be part of one’s conception of milk that milk can be present in a variety of
forms. One’s ability to employ the concept of milk can be reﬁned though a
developing conception of the varieties of forms in which milk can be present.
Similarly one’s ability to employ the concept of being green can be reﬁned
though a developing conception of the variety of respects in which something
can be green. A corollary is that the degree to which one is able generally to
respect the conditions of correct application of a term will vary with the level
of reﬁnement of one’s conception of the range of things to which it can be
applied.
The account I am offering is in keeping with something that concerns
Dancy in the passages I quoted: there is much that goes into an ability to
employ a term correctly, in the sense of being in keeping with its meaning,
that is not brought out by formulations of rules. This is true on my account
since the rules that I envisage to do not specify what it is to respect the rele-
vant conditions of correct application. But this is a virtue of the account, not
an objection to it. Since respecting the conditions of correct application is a
practical ability we should not expect any rules fully to articulate what it is to
have that ability. My suggestion, then, is that Dancy’s remarks, for all the in-
sight they undoubtedly contain, do not tell against the conception I have been
outlining. 14
14I would like to record my appreciation of the massive contribution that Pascal Engel has
made to the international dissemination of clear, constructive philosophy and to wish him well
on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday.
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